### T

#### “Engagement” requires the provision of positive incentives

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 1-2

The term *engagement* was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued by the United States toward South Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. To the Chinese, the word appears to mean simply the conduct of normal relations. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. Except in the few instances in which the United States has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably "engages" states and actors all the time in one capacity or another simply by interacting with them. This book, however, employs the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much more than a policy of nonisolation. In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the United States has important disagreements.

#### That means the plan must be a quid-pro-quo

De LaHunt 6 - Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in Colorado College's Facilities Services department (John, “Perverse and unintended” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, July-August, Science direct)

Incentives work on a *quid pro quo* basis – this for that. If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a reward. One could say that coercion is an incentive program – do as I say and I’ll let you live. However, I define an incentive as getting something you didn’t have before in exchange for new behavior, so that pretty much puts coercion in its own box, one separate from incentives. But fundamental problems plague the incentive approach. Like coercion, incentives are poor motivators in the long run, for at least two reasons – unintended consequences and perverse incentives.

#### Plan isn’t --- voting issue:

#### Limits --- it functionally narrows the topic because few cases can defend conditioning --- the alternative is hundreds of single import or export cases that explode the Neg’s research burden

#### Ground --- QPQ locks in core generics like soft power and foreign politics DAs, counterplans to add or remove a condition, and critiques of diplomacy

### DA

#### Chavez’s death means Pink tide at a cross road

\*Chavez was critical to petro diplomacy which funded the pink tide, but maduro doesn’t have the same leverage that he did

Panizza ’13 Dr Francisco Panizza is the Head of the Latin America International Affairs Programme at LSE IDEAS. He is a Reader in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics. “Latin America: Life after Chavez (and Lula)” – April 4th – http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2013/04/latin-america-life-after-chavez-and-lula/

The death of Chávez and the succession of Lula by Dilma Rousseff in Brazil leaves a big vacuum in the Latin American left. Even if, as likely as it is, Nicolás Maduro wins the presidency in Venezuela in April, he is no Chávez and will not have the resources that Chávez had to promote his petro-diplomacy. Three years into her first term in office, Rousseff remains highly popular in Brazil and will be a strong candidate for re-election in 2014. But she does not have the same presence as Lula in Latin America and her foreign policy priorities are rather different than those of her political mentor. Moreover, Venezuela is in a dire economic situation and Brazil’s economic growth has been lacklustre over the past two years.¶ The death of Chávez and the absence of Lula from frontline regional politics do not mean that the Pink Tide is necessarily coming to an end. But together with the retake of economic growth and the election of Peña Nieto in Mexico, the strong economic performance of Colombia, Peru and Chile and the emergence of the Alianza Pacifico as an alternative to Mercosur, suggest the unfolding of a much more complex and diverse process of regional change than encapsulated by the narrative of the rise of the left.

#### **The plan kills US resolve and funds the pink tide**

\*embargo is key to resolve

Removing it will not solve relations and it will give money to legitimize the Cuban regime and allow them to partner with other socialist or anti-american countries

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Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course.¶ Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left.¶ Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad.¶ The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already.¶ The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association.¶ Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in.¶ We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)¶ With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere.¶ The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time.¶ Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers.¶ The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet?¶ Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

#### Castro-led pink tide causes US-Russia military confrontations.

\*with petro power they will pay Russia to guarantee their security which brings the US and Russia into confrontation

Walser ‘8 (Ray Walser, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America at the Heritage Foundation – Chávez, Venezuela, and Russia: A New Cuban Missile Crisis? – WebMemo #2064 -- September 15th http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/wm2064.cfm)

Like his iconic mentor, Fidel Castro, Chávez thrives on mounting tensions and confrontation with the U.S. It is through confrontation that he attains political identity and larger-than-merited international standing. Like Fidel Castro, Chávez aspires to build and lead an anti-U.S., anti-Western coalition. Unlike Castro, however, Chávez is in possession of significant petroleum power and has varied sources of international support. There is danger that Chávez, like Castro, will invite Russia to serve as a guarantor of Venezuela's security and subsequently draw Russia, either willingly or unwillingly, into additional confrontations with the U.S. At present, Venezuela represents the single most difficult diplomatic and security challenge facing the U.S. in the immediate future. How the U.S. chooses to deal with this challenge will say much about the direction the next Administration will take as it shapes its policy toward America's neighbors in the hemisphere.

#### Small US-Russia conflicts can escalate or cause nuclear miscalc

\*US and Russia tensions are unpredictable which increases the risk of miscalc and the US or Russia would launch on warning causing nuclear war

Gottemoeller ‘8 (Rose Gottemoeller was sworn in as the United States Department of State's Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance on April 6, 2009. She was the chief negotiator of the follow on for the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty otherwise known as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation. Since 2000, she had been with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – “U.S.-Russia Cooperation on Iran: Aftermath of the Summer War in Georgia,” Carnegie Moscow Center, August- July 2008. PLESE NOTE – THIS CARD APPEARS IN A HOST OF CURRENT OPEN-SOURCE DEBATE DOCS AND THE URL THAT APPEARS ON THOSE CARDS MISDIRECTS TO A DIFFERENT Gottemoeller ARTICLE. The website below redirects to her October article: http://www.scribd.com/doc/13031239/RussianAmerican-Security-Relations-After-Georgia)

No holds barred, no rules—the United States and Russia may be heading to a confrontation more unpredictable and dangerous than any we have seen since the Cuban missile crisis. A confrontation today would be different—the two countries are in constant and intense communication, unlike the situation in 1962—but if those exchanges provoke mutual anger and recrimination, they have the potential to spark a dangerous crisis. This effect is especially dangerous because both countries are in presidential transitions. Russia, whose government is riven by corruption, internal competition, and disorder, is attempting an unprecedented tandem leadership arrangement. The United States is in the midst of its quadrennial election season, with both political parties competing to show that their man is more skilled and tough on national security issues than his opponent. The unpredictability of these two transitions stokes the potential for misunderstanding and descent into crisis. We must avoid such a crisis, because we have never succeeded in escaping the nuclear existential threat that we each pose to the other. We never even came close to transforming the U.S.–Russian relationship into one that is closer to that which the United States has with the United Kingdom or France. What if Russia had refused to confirm or deny that no nuclear weapons were on the bombers it flew to Venezuela? Our nuclear weapons are still faced off to launch on warning of an attack, and in a no-holds-barred confrontation between us, we could come close to nuclear catastrophe before we knew it.

### Case

#### No solvency—the Cuban government will impose its own restrictions even if the embargo is lifted—only gradualism can solve

Oracle 12(U.S. should approach Cuban embargo with caution <http://www.usforacle.com/u-s-should-approach-cuban-embargo-with-caution-1.2796443#.Uei9WdLOu0c> Novermber 21, nkj)

Since the embargo took effect in 1962, debate over its ramifications on the Cuban government and the potential good that lifting the sanctions could do for Cuban citizens has been a major ethical issue in American foreign affairs. Speculation arises that Cuba may be less tentative to allow American business interests in the country, as it would allow Cuban citizens and businesses to prosper and take control and capital away from the government.

The U.S. should move cautiously toward lifting the embargo and engaging in this type of economic partnership with Cuba, as it runs the risk of benefitting only the Cuban government’s agenda, rather than for the good of the people.

Currently, only a small amount of humanitarian aid, such as medical supplies and food, can cross the Cuban border and reach the Cuban population. Beyond that, Fidel and Raul Castro have shown little to no signs of giving in on their stance to remain self-sustaining. Cuba has proven that there is little wisdom in this philosophy, as much of the country lives in poverty.

The dilemma revolves around whether American engagement in Cuba would actually go to help its economy or just be pilfered by Castro’s regime. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lethinen (R-Fla.), chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,told the New York Times that “we should not buy into the facade the dictatorship is trying to create by announcing ‘reforms’ while, in reality, it’s tightening its grip on its people,” suggesting that the embargo should not only be left in place but also that its restrictions should be magnified.

Lifting the embargo, in theory, seems like it would open up a new era of investment in Cuba, allowing U.S. and Cuban businesses to work together and create economic capital for the state — and this is the ideal goal. Yet the risk of government corruption is too great, and the U.S. should work slowly to make changes to its policies, lest its actions end up supporting a regime it has fought so hard to suppress.

Despite how relentless American political discourse can get, the oppression that Cubans face from their government is daunting enough. While the Cuban embargo is unlikely to let up until their government is willing to lessen the totalitarian control over its people, America should be working proactively to end the embargo in a manner that pushes Cuba toward democracy and a free-market.

#### Lifting the embargo doesn’t solve—Castro will put up internal restrictions

Suchlicki 2k(JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. He is currently the Latin American Editor for Transaction Publishers and the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro (1997), now in its fourth edition, and editor with Irving L. Horowitz of Cuban Communism (1999). He is also the author of Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA (1998). He is a highly regarded consultant to both the private and public sector on Cuba and Latin American affairs. The U.S. Embargo of Cuba Jaime Suchlicki University of Miami June 2000 <http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf>, nkj)

Opponents of U.S. policy toward Cuba claim that if the embargo and the travel ban are lifted, the Cuban people would benefit economically; American companies will penetrate and influence the Cuban market; the Communist system would begin to crumble and a transition to a democratic society would be accelerated. These expectations are based on several incorrect assumptions. First, that Castro and the Cuban leadership are naïve and inexperienced and, therefore, would allow tourists and investments from the U.S. to subvert the revolution and influence internal developments in the island. Second, that Cuba would open up and allow U.S. investments in all sectors of the economy, instead of selecting which companies could trade and invest. Third, that Castro is so interested in close relations with the U.S. that he is willing to risk what has been upper-most in his mind for 40 years – total control of power and a legacy of opposition to “Yankee imperialism,” – in exchange for economic improvementsfor his people. During the Fifth Communist Party Congress in 1997, Castro emphasized “We will do what is necessary without renouncing our principles. We do not like capitalism and we will not abandon our Socialist system.” Castro also reiterated his long-standing anti-American posture, accusing the U.S. of waging economic war against his government and calling for “military preparedness against imperialist hostility.”

#### Cuba won’t cooperate after the plan

**Starr, USC IR professor, 2013**

(Pamela, “As Cuba Changes, U.S. Policy Does Not”, May, <https://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=539>)

Obstacles to improved bilateral relations, however, are not limited to the U.S. side of the Florida Straits. Our meetings suggested at least three reasons why, despite all their public protestations, the Cuban government may not place an end to the “blockade” at the top of their to-do list: the impact of history; the profound asymmetry of power between the two nations; and the utility of U.S. hostility in unifying the nation against threats to the survival of the Revolution. The history of U.S.-Cuban relations has taught Cuba to be very wary of the United States. Over a half century of hostility has taught each side to mistrust the other, but Cuban suspicion of the United States runs deeper. In part, this is because U.S. policy toward Cuba since 1961 has been geared toward removing the Cuban government from power, and in part it is because of U.S.-Cuban relations even before the Cuban Revolution. From the Cuban perspective, Cuba did not win its independence in 1898, as Americans learn in their history books, but in 1959 as a result of the Revolution. The U.S. goal in the first Cuban War of Independence (what we in the United States call the Spanish-American War) was the separation of Cuba from Spanish colonial domination, followed by its transformation into a de facto colony of the United States. Our Cuban hosts reminded us that the U.S.-imposed Platt Amendment to the Cuban constitution gave the United States the authority to intervene in Cuban politics virtually at will. Furthermore, bilateral economic accords allowed U.S. capital to dominate the production and refining of Cuba’s primary export product, sugar. In the words of Miguel Figueras, “Cuba remained a sugar colony, just of the United States instead of Spain.” Despite the abrogation of the Platt Amendment in 1933, the United States continued to dominate Cuban politics and economy for another quarter century. As a result, the deep poverty, inequality, corruption and repression that characterized Cuba for most of the early 20th century, and which seemed to reach their apogee in the 1950s, has come to be associated with U.S. domination of Cuba. For the delegation, it was not relevant whether or not this was a true reflection of historic fact. What was relevant is that this is how the history of our bilateral relationship is seen from the Cuban perspective and that this understanding of the past informs Cuban engagement with the United States today. Despite evident Cuban fondness for many aspects of American culture (baseball in particular stands out) and their openness to Americans who visit the island, Cubans have no desire to return to their pre-revolutionary past. And given the realities of geography and power, there seems to be a festering undercurrent of concern among Cubans that an uncontrolled opening to the United States could do just this. Indeed, several of our hosts reminded us of the historic U.S. interest, expressed by U.S. politicians from the early 19th century onward, to dominate Cuba and the parallel belief that geography made this both natural and inevitable. This understanding of the history of U.S.-Cuban relations, reinforced by the power asymmetry between our two countries, was clearly reflected in Ambassador Alzugaray’s insistence that Cuba has to be very careful in its dealings with the United States. He argued that this was because “a mistake could prove fatal for Cuba.” He further observed that the United States and Cuba have “never had normal relations” as sovereign equals, so how could we go about constructing them now? The consequence of these apprehensions appears to be an unstated policy of keeping the United States at arm’s length for now. When asked directly what the United States could do to convince Cuba of the sincerity of its desire to improve bilateral relations, the recently retired chief economist for the Ministry of Economy and Planning suggested a series of small confidence-building measures. Ambassador Alzugaray, however, insisted that small steps were not enough. Since the United States is the bigger country, it “needs to make a bigger effort.” The Cuban motivation to prevent a rapid warming in U.S.-Cuban relations also seems to reflect the regime’s historic use of U.S. hostility to unite the country against threats to the Revolution. All of the Cuban academics and former government officials with whom we spoke agreed that the economic and political “updating” of the Cuban system was as essential to the survival of Cuban socialism and its governing structure as it would be difficult to implement. They were convinced that to be successful, the early, critical phase of the reform process had to be undertaken with a Castro in power. This was because, as noted above, only a Castro has the legitimacy to convince Cubans to accept the third massive reorganization of the economy since 1959. Implicit in this opinion is the recognition that such profound economic change will produce opposition which, if not kept in check, could threaten the success of the reforms and thus the survival of the revolutionary project. In this context, U.S. hostility is apt to remain a useful if not essential tool for mitigating opposition to reform during the first and most difficult years of the process. This reading of the Cuban attitude toward the United States was reinforced by a recitation of the history of Cuban responses to U.S. attempts to reduce bilateral hostility provided by the Chief of the U.S. Mission in Cuba, John Caulfield. We were reminded that President Ford’s efforts to reduce tensions were greeted by Cuba’s decision to send troops to Angola. Carter’s efforts to normalize relations were greeted by the Mariel boatlift. Clinton’s were met by the shooting down of a Brothers to the Rescue plane. Finally, most recently, Obama efforts were greeted by the arrest and imprisonment of a USAID contractor on charges of espionage. Although Caulfield did not explicitly connect the dots, his meaning was clear: Alan Gross was likely arrested either to prevent any reduction in tensions between the two countries or because improving ties with the United States is simply not that important to Cuba. Whatever the reason for Alan Gross’ arrest, it is clear that Cuba is not preoccupied with encouraging the United States to end the embargo. Time and again we were told that economic reform is Cuba’s number one priority—the United States is not. The two countries do cooperate—on hurricane tracking, drug trafficking, migration, and preparing for potential gulf oil spills—but extending and improving bilateral cooperation is not high on the Cuban foreign policy agenda. Instead, Cuban foreign policy continues to emphasize efforts to maintain Cuban sovereignty and identity, which Ambassador Alzugaray noted have historically been most directly threatened by the United States. It is now charged with supporting the economic reform process by promoting foreign direct investment and the diversification of Cuban economic ties. In this context, the only potential role for the United States in the coming years that was mentioned by our Cuban hosts is the growing role of Cuban-American investment in Cuba.

#### Embargo doesn’t boost either economy

**Suchlicki, Miami history professor, 2013**

(Jaime, “The Case for Cuba Sanctions”, 2-26, <http://www.capitolhillcubans.com/2013/02/the-case-for-cuba-sanctions.html>)

- All trade with Cuba is done with state owned businesses. Since Cuba as very little credit and is a major debtor nation, the U.S. and its businesses would have to provide credits to Cuban enterprises. There is a long history of Cuba defaulting on loans. - Cuba is not likely to buy a substantial amount of products in the U.S. In the past few years, Cuba purchased several hundred million dollars of food in the U.S. That amount is now down to $170 million per year. Cuba can buy in any other country and it is not likely to abandon its relationship with China, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran to become a major trading partner of the U.S. - Cuba has very little to sell in the U.S. Nickel, one of Cuba's major exports, is controlled by the Canadians and exported primarily to Canada. Cuba has decimated its sugar industry and there is no appetite in the U.S. for more sugar. Cigars and rum are important Cuban exports. Yet, cigar production is mostly committed to the European market. Cuban rum could become an important export, competing with Puerto Rican and other Caribbean rums. Investments - In Cuba, foreign investors cannot partner with private Cuban citizens. They can only invest in the island through minority joint ventures with the government and its state enterprises. - The dominant enterprise in the Cuban economy is the Grupo GAESA, controlled by the Cuban military. Most investments are done through or with GAESA. Therefore, American companies willing to invest in Cuba will have to partner mostly with the Cuban military. - Cuba ranks 176 out of 177 countries in the world in terms of economic freedom. Outshined only by North Korea. It ranks as one of the most unattractive investments next to Iran, Zimbabwe, Libya, Mali, etc. - Foreign investors cannot hire, fire, or pay workers directly. They must go through the Cuban government employment agency which selects the workers. Investors pay the government in dollars or euros and the government pays the workers a meager 10% in Cuban pesos. - Corruption is pervasive, undermining equity and respect for the rule of law. - Cuba does not have an independent/transparent legal system. All judges are appointed by the State and all lawyers are licensed by the State. In the last few years, European investors have had over $1 billion arbitrarily frozen by the government and several investments have been confiscated. Cuba's Law 77 allows the State to expropriate foreign-invested assets for reason of "public utility" or "social interest." In the last year, the CEOs of three companies with extensive dealings with the Cuban government were arrested without charges.

#### Credibility isn’t real-no empirical example of events spilling over.

**Mercer, Washington political science professor, 2013**

(Jonathan, “Bad Reputation”, 5-13, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139376/jonathan-mercer/bad-reputation?page=show>, ldg)

There are two ways to answer those questions: through evidence and through logic. The first approach is easy. Do leaders assume that other leaders who have been irresolute in the past will be irresolute in the future and that, therefore, their threats are not credible? No; broad and deep evidence dispels that notion. In studies of the various political crises leading up to World War I and of those before and during the Korean War, I found that leaders did indeed worry about their reputations. But their worries were often mistaken. For example, when North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson was certain that America’s credibility was on the line. He believed that the United States’ allies in the West were in a state of “near-panic, as they watched to see whether the United States would act.” He was wrong. When one British cabinet secretary remarked to British Prime Minister Clement Attlee that Korea was “a rather distant obligation,” Attlee responded, “Distant -- yes, but nonetheless an obligation.” For their part, the French were indeed worried, but not because they doubted U.S. credibility. Instead, they feared that American resolve would lead to a major war over a strategically inconsequential piece of territory. Later, once the war was underway, Acheson feared that Chinese leaders thought the United States was “too feeble or hesitant to make a genuine stand,” as the CIA put it, and could therefore “be bullied or bluffed into backing down before Communist might.” In fact, Mao thought no such thing. He believed that the Americans intended to destroy his revolution, perhaps with nuclear weapons. Similarly, Ted Hopf, a professor of political science at the National University of Singapore, has found that the Soviet Union did not think the United States was irresolute for abandoning Vietnam; instead, Soviet officials were surprised that Americans would sacrifice so much for something the Soviets viewed as tangential to U.S. interests. And, in his study of Cold War showdowns, Dartmouth College professor Daryl Press found reputation to have been unimportant. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviets threatened to attack Berlin in response to any American use of force against Cuba; despite a long record of Soviet bluff and bluster over Berlin, policymakers in the United States took these threats seriously. As the record shows, reputations do not matter. Arguments never seem to be won on evidence alone, though, which is where the second approach comes in. Simply put, the logic behind the claim that reputation matters is self-invalidating; common knowledge of the claim changes behavior in ways that undermine it. For example, if I know that a specific signal makes my commitment seem credible, you know it too. You will discount my sending you that signal if you think I have reason to be deceptive. Logic kills strategy, in other words, because anything I can deduce, you can deduce as well. (And I can likely deduce your deduction.) This “he thinks that she thinks that he thinks” logic is part of how people strategize, and it is called recursion. Recursive thinking can get complicated. In The Logic of Images, Robert Jervis, a professor of international affairs at Columbia, wrote about a wonderful example of recursion in World War II. During the war, there was a French colonel who had been spying on the British and taking the secrets back to the Germans. The British flipped the Frenchman and started using him to pass bad information back to the Germans, who quickly became aware that the colonel was a double agent. After discovering that the Germans had found out about the Frenchman’s status, the British decided to inform the agent that the Normandy invasion was set for early June (it really was). The informant passed the information along, and it only served as proof to the Germans that the Allies were not invading Normandy in early June. All this is to illustrate how strategists use recursive thinking -- and how it quickly becomes nearly impossible to follow. Recursion poses another strategic problem: When does the game stop? If you count on my going only one round but I go multiple rounds, you will incorrectly predict my behavior. Consider this simple guessing game: A large number of competitors is asked to pick a number between zero and 100 that will be half the average of the number that everyone else picks. Students with training in game theory reason through multiple rounds and know that the logical answer is zero. But few people think like game theorists. Most engage in only two or three iterations, which leads them to believe that the right answer is around 25. And that brings us back to reputation. Say that Assad interprets Obama’s backing down on his red line remark as irresolute and that Assad’s reasoning stops there. He might decide that Obama will always be irresolute in the future and that Obama will play the second round of the game as if the first round had not happened. Neither the political context nor the interests at stake are important. In this case Assad, perhaps like McCain, is rather simple-minded when it comes to strategy. Of course, it is plausible that Assad is capable of reasoning just as well as the public at large and will go through two rounds of reasoning. In this case, he might realize that Obama has taken heat at home for his red line comment. Assad might also reason that Obama knows that Assad no longer believes that Obama will follow through on his threats. And that changes Assad’s calculations entirely: in the second round of the game, he will think it unlikely that whatever Obama says is a bluff. In some ways, then, a called bluff makes Obama’s future threats more credible, not less. Now, if Assad is a master strategist and game theory devotee, he might engage in three rounds of reasoning. In this case, Assad would believe that Obama is actually more likely to bluff because Obama thinks that Assad thinks that Obama is less likely to bluff. Keeping the logic straight is difficult, but it is also irrelevant: no one knows how many rounds the game will go on, for there is no logical place to stop. Those who argue that reputation and credibility matter are depending on strategists to be simple-minded, illogical, and blissfully unaware of recursion. And if Assad is illogical, then calibrating U.S. foreign policy to elicit particular responses from him is pointless. The same goes for other adversaries. No one can know what the North Korean leadership will make of U.S. behavior in Syria. They might think that Obama has no credibility, that he is, in fact, resolute, or that he is driven by other U.S. interests. Whatever conclusion they come to will be driven by their own beliefs and interests. As British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury once complained, studying maps “disturbed men’s reasoning powers.” His strategists, he thought, would have liked to “annex the moon in order to prevent its being appropriated by the planet Mars.” Just as Salisbury mocked his strategists’ fears, the United States should not let concerns over credibility drive policymaking. Wars should be fought to protect interests and values, not to defend imaginary reputations from simpletons and illogical foes. In other words, the Obama administration should not make Acheson’s mistake in Syria and let fears that others might think it irresolute drive it to disaster. Instead, it should refocus on what U.S. interests really are in Syria, and how it can best obtain them.

#### Cuban democracy is emerging organically now --- lifting the embargo would empower the regime.

**Radosh, Hudson Institute adjunt fellow, 2013**

(Ron, “The Time to Help Cuba’s Brave Dissidents Is Now: Why the Embargo Must Not be Lifted”, 3-18, http://pjmedia.com/ronradosh/2013/03/18/the-time-to-help-cubas-brave-dissidents-is-now-why-the-embargo-must-not-be-lifted/?singlepage=true)

The presence this week in the United States of dissident Cuban blogger Yoani Sanchez, the most well-known of Cuba’s brave dissident community, has again brought to the forefront the reality of the situation facing the Cuban people in the Castro brothers’ prison state. Last week, Sanchez spoke at both Columbia University and New York University, where she recalled how different things were a decade ago during what Cubans refer to as the “Black Spring,” when independent journalists were given a summary trial and large jail sentences. It was the arrest of these opponents of the regime that led to the Ladies in White, the wives and mothers of prisoners who regularly marched in silence in front of government buildings each week. Ten years ago, Sanchez pointed out, there was no access to the internet for anyone in Cuba, it barely existed, and there were no flash drives to record information and no social networking sites to spread the word about the state’s repression. Now, bloggers like Sanchez — who gains access to tourist hotels, posing as a Westerner so she can use their internet facilities — have managed to get past the regime’s ban on use of the internet and to freely reveal to the world the reality of life in Cuba. “Many independent journalists and peaceful activists who began their work precariously have now resorted to blogs, for example, as a format to circulate information about programs and initiatives to collect signatures,” Sánchez said. She and others have done just that, getting signatures on petitions to demand the release in particular of one well-known Cuban journalist. In addition, Sanchez is circulating a petition known as “the Citizens’ Demand” to pressure the Cuban regime to ratify the UN political rights agreements signed in 2008. The signers are calling for a legal and political framework for a full debate of all ideas relevant to the internal crisis facing the Cuban people on the island. In effect, this demand for democracy is nothing less than a call for creation of a political democracy that would, if implemented, lead to the collapse of the edifice of the Communist one-party state. As Sanchez put it: “It is important to have initiatives for transforming the law and demand concrete public spaces within the country.” Since a totalitarian state does not allow for such space and prohibits a real civil society from emerging, the actions of the dissidents are a mechanism for forcing such change from below. They are fighting what her fellow blogger Orlando Luis Pardo Lazo called a “culture of fear over the civil society” that the secret police seek to enforce. For liberals and leftists in the United States, the main demand they always raise is to “lift the embargo.” According to the argument they regularly make, the embargo has to be lifted for the following reasons: 1) it is not effective; 2) it gives the regime the excuse to argue to the Cuban people that the poverty they suffer is the result of not being able to trade with the United States and other nations honoring the embargo; 3) lifting the embargo would hence deprive Fidel and Raul Castro from their main propaganda argument, revealing that the reasons for a collapsed economy are the regime’s own policies; and 4) trade and travel from the United States would expose Cubans to Americans and others who live in freedom, help curb anti-Americanism, and eventually lead to slow reform of the system. What these liberals and leftists leave out is that this demand — lifting the embargo — is also the number one desire of the Cuban Communists. In making it the key demand, these well-meaning (at least some of them) liberals echo precisely the propaganda of the Cuban government, thereby doing the Castro brothers’ work for them here in the United States. And, as we know, many of those who call for this actually believe that the Cuban government is on the side of the people, and favor the Cuban Revolution which they see as a positive role model for the region. They have always believed, since the 1960s of their youth, that socialism in Cuba has pointed the way forward to development and liberty based on the kind of socialist society they wish could exist in the United States. Another brave group of Cuban opponents of the regime has actually taped a television interview filmed illegally in Havana. “Young Cuban democracy leader Antonio Rodiles,” an American support group called Capitol Hill Cubans has reported, “has just released the latest episode of his civil society project Estado de Sats (filmed within Cuba), where he discusses the importance U.S. sanctions policy with two of Cuba’s most renowned opposition activists and former political prisoners, Guillermo Fariñas and Jose Daniel Ferrer.” The argument they present is aimed directly at those on the left in the United States, some of whom think they are helping democracy in Cuba by calling for an end to the embargo. In strong and clear language, the two dissidents say the following: If at this time, the [economic] need of the Cuban government is satisfied through financial credits and the lifting of the embargo, repression would increase, it would allow for a continuation of the Castro’s society, totalitarianism would strengthen its hold and philosophically, it would just be immoral … If you did an opinion poll among Cuban opposition activists, the majority would be in favor of not lifting the embargo. Next, they nail the claim that travel without restrictions by citizens of our country to Cuba would help spread freedom. The men respond: In a cost-benefit analysis, travel to Cuba by Americans would be of greatest benefit to the Castro regime, while the Cuban people would be the least to benefit. With all of the controls and the totalitarian system of the government, it would be perfectly able to control such travel. We know this, as I reported a few months ago, about how a group of Americans taking the usual state-controlled Potemkin village tour came back raving about how wonderful and free Cuba is, and how Cuban socialism works. Finally, the two former prisoners made this point about lifting the embargo: To lift the embargo at this time would be very prejudicial to us. The government prioritizes all of the institutions that guarantee its hold on power. The regime’s political police and its jailers receive a much higher salary and privileges than a doctor or engineer, or than any other worker that benefits society. We’ve all seen municipalities with no fuel for an ambulance, yet with 10, 15, 20, 50 cars full of fuel ready to go repress peaceful human rights activists.

#### Mutliple complications prevent effective democratic transition

Suchlicki 12(JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. He is currently the Latin American Editor for Transaction Publishers and the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro (1997), now in its fourth edition, and editor with Irving L. Horowitz of Cuban Communism (1999). He is also the author of Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA (1998). He is a highly regarded consultant to both the private and public sector on Cuba and Latin American affairs “Getting Ready for Life after Castro” May 11 2012 <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/11/getting_ready_for_life_after_castro?page=0,2>, nkj)

Similarly, the apparent harmonious race relations of the Castro era may also experience severe strains. There has been a gradual Africanization of the Cuban population over the past several decades due to greater intermarriage and out-migration of a million mostly white Cubans. This has led to some fear and resentment among whites in the island. At the same time, blacks feel that they have been left out of the political process, as whites still dominate the higher echelons of the Castro power structure. The dollarization of the economy and the recent relaxation in the amount of remittances allowed to flow from the U.S. to Cuba has accentuated these differences. Since most Cuban-Americans are white, black Cubans receive fewer dollars from abroad. Significant racial tension could well result as these feelings and frustrations are aired in a politically open environment. (Race Relations in Cuba, Juan Antonio Alvarado - in Spanish).

Perhaps the most difficult problem that a post-Castro leadership will have to face is acceptance of the rule of law. (Establishing the Rule of Law in Cuba, Laura Patallo Sánchez.) Every day, Cubans violate communist laws: they steal from state enterprises, participate in the black market, and engage in all types of illegal activities, including widespread graft and corruption. They do this to survive. Getting rid of those necessary vices will not be easy, especially since many of them pre-date the Castro era.

Unwillingness to obey laws will be matched by the unwillingness to sacrifice and endure the difficult years that will follow the end of communism. A whole generation has grown up under the constant exhortations and pressures of the communist leadership to work hard and sacrifice for the sake of society. The youth are alienated from the political process, and are eager for a better life. Many want to immigrate to the United States. If the present rate of visa requests at the U.S. consular office in Havana is any indication, more than two million Cubans want to move permanently to the United States.

Under the normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations, Cubans will be free to visit the United States. Many will come as tourists and stay as illegal immigrants; others will be claimed as legal immigrants by relatives who are already naturalized citizens. A significant out-migration is certain, posing an added major problem for U.S. policymakers at a time of increasing anti-immigration sentiment.

While many Cubans want to leave Cuba, few Cuban-Americans will be inclined to abandon their lives in the United States and return to the island, especially if Cuba experiences a slow and painful transition period. Although those exiles who are allowed to return will be welcomed initially as business partners and investors, they are also likely to be resented, especially if they become involved in domestic politics. Readjusting the views and values of the exile population to those of the island will be a difficult and lengthy process. (The Role of the Cuban-American Community in the Cuban Transition, Sergio Diaz Briquets and Jorge Perez-Lopez).

The future of Cuba is therefore clouded with problems and uncertainties. More than five decades of communism have left profound scars on Cuban society. As in Eastern Europe and Nicaragua, reconstruction may be slow, painful, and tortuous. Unlike these countries, Cuba has at least three unique advantages: a long history of close relations with the United States; excellent preconditions for tourism; and a large and wealthy exile population. These factors could converge to transform the country's living standards, but only if the future Cuban leadership creates the necessary conditions for an open, legally fair economy and an open, tolerant, and responsible political system. Unfortunately, life in Cuba is likely to remain difficult for a while longer.

#### Peace theory wrong-either historical cases disprove it OR the theory is watered down to the point it doesn’t explain anything.

**Rosato, Notre Dame political science professor, 2011**

(Sebastian, The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, google books, ldg)

In this section I evaluate the empirical claims at the core of democratic peace theory. I find scant support for both of them. Democracies do go to war with one another and attempts to prove that they do not have the unintended consequence of making the no war claim uninteresting. Moreover there is little evidence that democracies are less likely to engage each other in militarized disputes than other pairs of states because of their shared regime type. The finding is either statistically insignificant or explained by factors other than democracy. The claim that democracies rarely if ever go to war with one another is either incorrect or unsurprising. A careful review of the evidence suggests that contrary to the assertions of democratic peace proponents, there have been a handful of wars between democracies and these can only be excluded by imposing a highly restrictive definition of democracy. This would not pose a problem were it not for the fact that by raising the requirements for a state to be judged democratic, the theory's defenders reduce the number of democracies in the analysis to such an extent that the finding of no war between them is wholly to be expected. There is considerable evidence that the absence of war claim is incorrect. As Christopher Layne (2001, pg. 801) notes. "The most damning indictment of democratic peace theory is that it happens not to be true: democratic states have gone to war with one another." For example, categorizing a state as democratic if it achieves a democracy score of six or more in the Polity dataset on regime type - as several analysts do - yields three inter-democratic wars: the American Civil War, the Spanish American War and the Boer War."This is something defenders of the theory readily admit - adopting relatively inclusive definitions of democracy, they themselves generate anywhere between a dozen and three dozen cases of inter-democratic war. In order to exclude these anomalies and thereby preserve the absence of war claim, the theory`s defenders restrict their definitions of democracy. In the most compelling analysis to date Ray (1993, pp. 256-9, 269) argues that no two democracies have gone to war with one another as long as a democracy is defined as follows: the members of the executive and legislative branches are determined in fair and competitive elections, which is to say that at least two independent parties contest the election, half of the adult population is eligible to vote and the possibility that the governing party can lose has been established by historical precedent. Similarly Doyle (1983a. pp. 216-17) rescues the claim by arguing that states"˜ domestic and foreign policies must both be subject to the control of the citizenry if they are to be considered liberal. Russett meanwhile, argues that his no war claim rests on defining democracy as a state with a voting franchise for a substantial fraction of the population, a government brought to power in elections involving two or more legally recognized parties. a popularly elected executive or one responsible to an elected legislature, requirements for civil liberties including free speech and demonstrated longevity of at least three years (Russell 1993. pp. 14-16). Despite imposing these definitional restrictions, proponents of the democratic peace cannot exclude up to five major wars. a figure which, if confirmed, would invalidate the democratic peace by their own admission (Ray 1995. p. 27), The first is the War of 1812 between Britain and the United States. Ray argues that it does not contradict the claim because Britain does not meet his suffrage requirement. Yet this does not make Britain any less democratic than the United States at the time where less than half the adult population was eligible to vote. In fact, as Layne (200l. p. 801) notes, "the United States was not appreciably more democratic than unreformed Britain." This poses a problem for the democratic peace: if the United States was a democracy, and Ray believes it was, then Britain was also a democracy and the War of 1812 was an inter-democratic war. The second case is the American Civil War. Democratic peace theorists believe the United States was a democracy in 1861, but exclude the case on the grounds that it was a civil rather than interstate war (Russett 1993. pp. 16-17). However, a plausible argument can be made that the United States was not a state but a union of states and that this was therefore a war between states rather than within one. Note, for example, that the term "United States" was plural rather than singular at the time and the conflict was known as the "War Between the States." This being the case the Civil War also contradicts the claim. The Spanish-American and Boer wars constitute two further exceptions to the rule. Ray excludes the former because half the members of Spain`s upper house held their positions through hereditary succession or royal appointment. Yet this made Spain little different to Britain, which he classifies as a democracy at the time, thereby leading to the conclusion that the Spanish-American War was a war between democracies. Similarly, it is hard to accept his claim that the Orange Free State was not a democracy during the Boer War because black Africans were not allowed to vote when he is content to classify the United States us a democracy in the second half of the nineteenth century (Ray 1993, pp. 265, 267; Layne 200l. p. 802). In short, defenders of the democratic peace can only rescue their core claim through the selective application of highly restrictive criteria. Perhaps the most important exception is World War I, which by virtue of the fact that Germany fought against Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and the United States would count as five instances of war between liberal stares in most analyses of the democratic peace."As Ido Oren (1995 pp, 178-9) has shown, Germany was widely considered to be a liberal state prior to World War I: "Germany was a member of a select group of the most politically advanced countries, far more advanced than some of the nations that are currently coded as having been 'liberal' during that period." In fact, Germany was consistently placed toward the top of that group, "either as second only to the United States . . . or as positioned below England and above France." Moreover. Doyle`s assertion that the case ought to be excluded because Germany was liberal domestically, but not in foreign affairs, docs not stand up to scrutiny, As Layne (1994, p. 42) points out, foreign policy was \*insulated from parliamentary control" in both France and Britain, two purportedly liberal states (see also Mearsheimer l990, p. SI. fn, 77; Layne 2001. pp. 803 807), Thus it is difficult to classify Germany as non-liberal and World War I constitutes an important exception to the finding.

#### Cuba will say no – they don’t trust we’ll follow through and the embargo serves their interests

French 13, Director of the New America Foundation U.S. – Cuba Policy Initiative, (Anya Landau, “Secretary Kerry: Will He or Won't He Take On Cuba” http://thehavananote.com/2013/02/secretary\_kerry\_will\_he\_or\_wont\_he\_take\_cuba)

And, then there’s the Cuban government. As much as many in the Cuban government (particularly the diplomatic corps) want to reduce tensions with the United States and finally make real progress on long-standing grievances held by both sides, they aren’t desperate for the big thaw. Many U.S. analysts, including in government, speculate that this is because Cuba’s leaders don’t really want to change the relationship, that strife serves their needs better than would the alternative. That could be so, but there’s also a hefty amount of skepticism and pride on the Cuban side, as well. After so many decades and layers of what Cuba calls the U.S. blockade, Cubans are unwilling to have the terms of any ‘surrender’ dictated to them. In fact, they are bound and determined that there will be no surrender. They would argue, what is there to surrender but their government’s very existence, something the leadership obviously isn’t going to put on the table.¶ Many in the Cuban government question whether the U.S. would offer anything that truly matters to Cuba, or honor any commitments made. Arguably, the last deal the U.S. made good on was struck during the Missile Crisis of October 1963, and Cuba wasn’t even at the table for that. It’s a lesser known fact that the United States never fully implemented the 1994/1995 migration accords, which committed both nations to work to prevent migration by irregular means. The U.S. did stop accepting illegal migrants from Cuba found at sea, but it still accepts them when they reach our shores – thus dubbed our ‘wet foot, dry foot’ policy. And with our generous adjustment policy offering a green card after one year, the incentive to make the illegal trip remains largely in place.

#### Removing the embargo crushes sustainable Cuban agriculture

**Gonzalez, Seattle law professor, 2003**

(Carmen, Seasons Of Resistance: Sustainable Agriculture And Food Security In Cuba, p. 729-33)

Notwithstanding these problems, the greatest challenge to the agricultural development strategy adopted by the Cuban government in the aftermath of the Special Period is likely to be external – the renewal of trade relations with the United States. From the colonial era through the beginning of the Special Period, economic development in Cuba has been constrained by Cuba’s relationship with a series of primary trading partners. Cuba’s export-oriented sugar monoculture and its reliance on imports to satisfy domestic food needs was imposed by the Spanish colonizers, reinforced by the United States, and maintained during the Soviet era. It was not until the collapse of the socialist trading bloc and the strengthening of the U.S. embargo that Cuba was able to embark upon a radically different development path. Cuba was able to transform its agricultural development model as a consequence of the political and economic autonomy occasioned by its relative economic isolation, including its exclusion from major international financial and trade institutions. Paradoxically, while the U.S. embargo subjected Cuba to immense economic hardship, it also gave the Cuban government free rein to adopt agricultural policies that ran counter to the prevailing neoliberal model and that protected Cuban farmers against ruinous competition from highly subsidized agricultural producers in the United States and the European Union. Due to U.S. pressure, Cuba was excluded from regional and international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.n413 Cuba also failed to reach full membership in any regional trade association and was barred from the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). However, as U.S. agribusiness clamors to ease trade restrictions with Cuba, the lifting of the embargo and the end of Cuba’s economic isolation may only be a matter of time. It is unclear how the Cuban government will respond to the immense political and economic pressure from the United States to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that would curtail Cuban sovereignty and erode protection for Cuban agriculture.n416 If Cuba accedes to the dictates of agricultural trade liberalization, it appears likely that Cuba’s gains in agricultural diversification and food self-sufficiency will be undercut by cheap, subsidized food imports from the United States and other industrialized countries. Furthermore, Cuba’s experiment with organic and semi-organic agriculture may be jeopardized if the Cuban government is either unwilling or unable to restrict the sale of agrochemicals to Cuban farmers – as the Cuban government failed to restrict U.S. rice imports in the first half of the twentieth century. Cuba is once again at a crossroads – as it was in 1963, when the government abandoned economic diversification, renewed its emphasis on sugar production, and replaced its trade dependence on the United States with trade dependence on the socialist bloc. In the end, the future of Cuban agriculture will likely turn on a combination of external factors (such as world market prices for Cuban exports and Cuba’s future economic integration with the United States) and internal factors (such as the level of grassroots and governmental support for the alternative development model developed during the Special Period). While this Article has examined the major pieces of legislation that transformed agricultural production in Cuba, and the government’s implementation of these laws, it is important to remember that these reforms had their genesis in the economic crisis of the early 1990s and in the creative legal, and extra-legal, survival strategies developed by ordinary Cubans. The distribution of land to thousands of small producers and the promotion of urban agriculture were in response to the self-help measures undertaken by Cuban citizens during the Special Period. As the economic crisis intensified, Cuban citizens spontaneously seized and cultivated parcels of land in state farms, along the highways, and in vacant lots, and started growing food in patios, balconies, front yards, and community gardens. Similarly, the opening of the agricultural markets was in direct response to the booming black market and its deleterious effect on the state’s food distribution system. Finally, it was the small private farmer, the neglected stepchild of the Revolution, who kept alive the traditional agroecological techniques that formed the basis of Cuba’s experiment with organic agriculture. The survival of Cuba’s alternative agricultural model will therefore depend, at least in part, on whether this model is viewed by Cuban citizens and by the Cuban leadership as a necessary adaptation to severe economic crisis or as a path-breaking achievement worthy of pride and emulation. The history of Cuban agriculture has been one of resistance and accommodation to larger economic and political forces that shaped the destiny of the island nation. Likewise, the transformation of Cuban agriculture has occurred through resistance and accommodation by Cuban workers and farmers to the hardships of the Special Period. The lifting of the U.S. economic embargo and the subjection of Cuba to the full force of economic globalization will present an enormous challenge to the retention of an agricultural development model borne of crisis and isolation. Whether Cuba will be able to resist the re-imposition of a capital-intensive, export-oriented, import-reliant agricultural model will depend on the ability of the Cuban leadership to appreciate the benefits of sustainable agriculture and to protect Cuba’s alternative agricultural model in the face of overwhelming political and economic pressure from the United States and from the global trading system.

#### Cuban sustainable urban agriculture is a global model that’s spurring worldwide adoption

**Ergas, Oregon sociology graduate student, 2013**

(Christina, “Cuban Urban Agriculture as a Strategy for Food Sovereignty”, March, <http://monthlyreview.org/2013/03/01/cuban-urban-agriculture-as-a-strategy-for-food-sovereignty>

The agricultural revolution in Cuba has ignited the imaginations of people all over the world. Cuba’s model serves as a foundation for self-sufficiency, resistance to neocolonialist development projects, innovations in agroecology, alternatives to monoculture, and a more environmentally sustainable society. Instead of turning towards austerity measures and making concessions to large international powers during a severe economic downturn, Cubans reorganized food production and worked to gain food sovereignty as a means of subsistence, environmental protection, and national security.1 While these efforts may have been born of economic necessity, they are impressive as they have been developed in opposition to a corporate global food regime. In Sustainable Urban Agriculture in Cuba, Sinan Koont indicates that most of the global South has lost any semblance of food sovereignty—the ability to be self-sufficient, to practice a more sustainable form of agriculture, and to direct farming toward meeting the needs of people within a country, rather than producing cash crops for export (187). The World Bank and International Monetary Fund imposed structural adjustment programs and free trade agreements on the so-called third world. These policies increased the influence of multinational corporations, such as Monsanto and Cargill, in global food production. They also encouraged large-scale monocultures, whereby food production is specialized by region for international trade. These policies threatened the national food security of countries in several interrelated ways.2 First, economically vulnerable countries are subject to the vagaries of the international marketplace, fluctuating food prices, and heavily subsidized produce from the global North that undermine the ability of the former to compete. Second, in a for-profit economic system, certain crops, like sugarcane, potato, and corn, are planted to produce biofuels, primarily ethanol, instead of food for poor populations. Rich nations that can afford to buy crops for biofuels inflate market prices for food, and when droughts or floods destroy whole harvests, then scarce food still goes to the highest bidder. Third, nations that specialize in cash crops for export must import food, increasing overall insecurity and dependency on trade networks. These nations are more vulnerable to changes in the costs of petroleum, as it influences expenses associated with transportation, fertilizers, pesticides, and the overall price of food. In countries with higher per capita incomes, increasing food costs are an annoyance for many people but not necessarily life threatening. In countries with high rates of poverty, price increases can be devastating. All of the above problems converged during the 2007–2008 food crisis that resulted in riots in Egypt, Haiti, Indonesia, Mexico, and Bangladesh, just to name a few. People worldwide have been affected by these policies and have fought back. Some nations have taken to task corporations like Monsanto, as in the case of India’s response to genetically modified eggplant, which involved a boycott of Monsanto’s products and demands for the eradication of genetically modified foods.3 There are burgeoning local food movements, even in the United States, that despite numerous challenges attempt to produce food outside the current large-scale agricultural paradigm.4 There are also international movements that are working to change agricultural policies and practices. For example, La Vía Campesina is an international movement comprised of peasants, small-scale farmers, and their allies. Their primary goals are to stop neoliberal policies that promote oligopolistic corporate control over agriculture and to promote food sovereignty. In conjunction with these movements, Cuba has made remarkable strides toward establishing a system of food sovereignty. One of their most notable projects in this regard is their institutionalized and organized effort to expand agroecological practices, or a system of agriculture that is based on ecological principles and environmental concerns. Cuba has largely transformed food production in order to pursue a more sustainable path. These practices are not limited to the countryside. Cuba is the recognized leader of urban agriculture.5 As Koont highlights, the Cuban National Group for Urban Agriculture defines urban agriculture as the production of food within the urban and peri-urban perimeter, using intensive methods, paying attention to the human-crop-animal-environment interrelationships, and taking advantage of the urban infrastructure with its stable labor force. This results in diversified production of crops and animals throughout the year, based on sustainable practices which allow the recycling of waste materials (29). In 2007, urban agriculture comprised approximately 14.6 percent of agriculture in Cuba. Almost all of urban agriculture is organic. Cuba’s environmental protections and agricultural innovations have gained considerable recognition. The 2006 Sustainability Index Report, put together by the World Wildlife Fund by combining the United Nations Human Development Index and Ecological Footprint measures (or natural resource use per capita), contends that the only nation in the world that is living sustainably is Cuba.6 The island nation is particularly lauded for its strides in urban food production.7 Sustainable Urban Agriculture in Cuba is the first book to take a comprehensive look at this practice around the entire island. Koont indicates that the significance of urban agriculture in Cuba is that although Cuba is not completely food self-sufficient, it is the only example the world has of a country that produces most of its food locally, employing agroecological techniques for production. Furthermore, most of the food produced is for local consumption. As a result, Cuba has one of the shortest producer-to-consumer chains in the world. In this book, Koont documents the impressive transformations that have taken place within this nation. While Cuba imports the majority of its calories and protein, urban agriculture has increased food security and sovereignty in the area of vegetable production. In 2005, Cuba was “importing 60 percent to 70 percent of what it consumes [mostly so-called bulk foods] at an estimated cost of $1.5 billion to $2 billion annually.”8 However, urban agriculture within and around Havana accounts for 60–90 percent of the produce consumed in the city and utilizes about 87,000 acres of land.9 Cubans employ various forms of urban agriculture, including gardens, reforestation projects, and small-scale livestock operations. In 2010, 75 percent of the Cuban population lived in cities—a city is defined as such if the population is in excess of 1,000 persons.10 Thus, urban food production is the most practical and efficient means to supply the population with food. These transformations did not suddenly materialize. Koont provides a useful overview of the historical circumstances that contributed to changes in food production in Cuba. After the 1959 revolution and the subsequent imposition of the U.S. embargo, Cuba became reliant on the Soviet Union. Cubans used large-scale, industrial, monoculture to produce sugar, which was exchanged for Soviet petroleum and currency. The economy was largely tied to high-yield sugar production. In a vicious cycle, this type of agriculture required importing agrochemical fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, and oil to run heavy machinery. In 1989, three times more arable land in Cuba was utilized to produce sugar for export than food for national consumption. Most of the Cuban diet came from imported food.11 When the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, Cubans and their economy suffered greatly. Cubans no longer had access to the inputs required to maintain large-scale agriculture, given how dependent such agriculture is on oil. To make matters worse, the end of trade between the Soviet Bloc and Cuba resulted in a loss of access to food, which reduced Cubans’ protein intake by 30 percent.12 The system of agriculture that was in place was not sustainable or organized for self-sufficiency. Cubans refer to the ensuing period of resource scarcity as the Special Period in Peace Time. This period included shortages of food, fuel, and medicine. Faced with food scarcity and malnutrition, Cubans had to revamp their food production systems, which included collectively producing a variety of crops in the most efficient manner possible. Additionally, the necessary mission of Cuban politicians, ecologists, farmers, scientists, biologists, and farm workers was to mend the ecological cycles of interdependence that large-scale, exploitative agriculture destroyed.13 In spite of these hardships, Cuban society was equipped to contend with the ensuing crisis, given the country’s specific commitments and agroecological projects that were already in operation. The Cuban government and leadership worked to provide institutional support to re-direct food production and to enable the development of an extensive urban agricultural project. Governmental policies, following the 1959 revolution, that prioritized extending education, science, and technology served as a springboard for these new agricultural projects. First, the revolutionary government established organizations to address social problems and concerns. These organizations served as supply and distribution networks for food and centers for research that examined farmers’ traditional knowledge, continuing education programs that taught agroecological practices, distribution of technological innovations, and evaluation of existing programs and operations. Second, the government prioritized human resources and capabilities. Thus, the Cuban government invested in human capital by making education more widely available and accessible at all levels. Making use of the organizational infrastructure and investing in the Cuban people made the agroecological transition possible during the economic crisis in the early 1990s. Koont examines how the early agroecological projects, prior to the Special Period, served as a basis for future development and expansion of the revolutionary transformation of agriculture in Cuba. Science is publicly owned and directed toward furthering human development, rather than capital accumulation. Cuba had the human resources to address food scarcity, given that they had 11 percent of the scientists in Latin America. Scientists were already experimenting with agroecology, in order to take advantage of ecological synergisms, utilizing biodiversity and biological pest control. These efforts were focused on diminishing the need for inputs such as artificial fertilizers and pesticides. Other projects included integrating animals into rotational grazing systems with crops and diversifying with polycultures. Cubans also began recycling sugarcane waste as cattle feed; the cows, in turn, excrete waste that is applied to soil as fertilizer, thereby restoring ecological interdependence. By combining manure with worm castings, Cubans were able to fertilize most of their crops organically without having to import fertilizer from long distances. Their experimentation also included creating urban organopónicos, which were constructed four years before the Soviet collapse. Organopónicos are raised beds of organic materials confined in rectangular walls where plants are grown in areas with poor soil quality. Additionally, personal household plots had long existed within urban areas.14 Altogether these experiments and projects served as the foundation to pursue greater self-sufficiency, a system of urban agriculture, and a more sustainable form of food production. The pursuit of food sovereignty has yielded many benefits. Urban agriculture has increased food production, employment, environmental recovery and protection, and community building. Perhaps the most impressive strides are in the area of food security. In the early 1990s, during the Special Period, Cubans’ caloric intake decreased to approximately 1,863 calories a day. In the midst of food scarcity, Cuba ramped up food production. Between 1994 and 2006, Cubans increased urban output by a thousand fold, with an annual growth rate of 78 percent a year. In 2001, Cubans cultivated 18,591 hectares of urban land; in 2006, 52,389 hectares were cultivated. As a result of these efforts, the caloric intake for the population averaged 3,356 calories a day in 2005. During the economic crisis, unemployment sharply increased. However, the creation of extensive urban agricultural programs, which included centers of information and education, provided new jobs that subsumed 7 percent of the workforce and provided good wages. Urban agriculture and reforestation projects also constituted important gains for the environment. Shifting food production away from reliance on fossil fuels and petrochemicals is better for human health and reduces the carbon dioxide emissions associated with food production. Urban reforestation projects provide sinks for air pollution and help beautify cities. Finally, local production of food decreases food miles. It also requires both local producers and consumers. Therefore, community members get to know each other and are responsible for each other through the production and consumption of food. Sustainable Urban Agriculture in Cuba is a detailed documentation of the agroecological transformation in Cuba. Koont delivers a significant amount of information regarding the mechanics of urban agriculture. He highlights the enabling factors of urban agriculture in Cuba, which are the government’s creation of the organizational infrastructure and their investment in human capital. He also provides an assessment of the results from urban agriculture. The results he discusses are gains made in food production, increased employment, environmental recovery and protection, and community building. However, the majority of the book reads like a dry technical manual or guide to urban agriculture, something akin to official Cuban government documents. There are many bulleted lists throughout each chapter that outline types of crops grown, strategies, key features of urban agriculture in Cuba, collaborating organizations, evaluation criteria, tons of produce in each province, program objectives, and the lists go on. While the book contains a significant amount of information regarding process, extent, technology, education, and evaluation surrounding urban agriculture in Cuba, it does little in the way of setting up a theoretical framework and thoroughly exploring the significance of Cuba’s model of urban agriculture for the world. The introduction and the final chapter of the book are the two chapters that touch on Cuba’s relevance and implications. In addition, Koont offers minimal critical analysis of the challenges that Cubans still face in their quest for food sovereignty. Despite these shortcomings, Koont provides a much-needed detailed account of the strides made in Cuban urban agriculture. Cuba’s example has clear implications for food sovereignty and security for the rest of the world. With the very real threat of climate change, potential energy crises, market fluctuations, worldwide droughts, or other economic and environmental problems that may force nations to relocalize food production, this example can serve as a template for future food sovereignty. We can continue to learn from Cuba as they generate new technologies and innovations in organic urban agriculture into the future. In addition, the Cuban example serves as a testament to the potential for a society’s resilience and is worth investigating not just for their innovations, but for inspiration.

#### Expanding urban agriculture prevents ag collapse and extinction

**Peters, Oregon JD, 2010**

(Kathryn, “Creating a Sustainable Urban Agriculture Revolution”, J. Envtl. Law And Litigation, http://law.uoregon.edu/org/jell/docs/251/peters.pdf)

An adequate food supply is essential for the survival of the human race. Historically, the U.S. food system has been one of abundance. However, degradation of the environment, climate change, dependence on foreign oil and food imports, urban development trends, and increased demand due to population growth and the emerging biofuel industry2 all threaten our food supply. In response to these threats, local-food and sustainable agriculture movements have recently formed to raise awareness of the need to pursue alternatives to the current system.3 In 2009, the White House acknowledged the importance of changing the way we grow food by planting an organic garden on its grounds.4 In the wake of the economic crisis of 2008, victory gardens, which were first made popular during the World War II era, have reemerged and created additional awareness of the need to pursue food production alternatives.5 Victory gardens and local sustainable agriculture reduce dependency on the established food production system, but, because the U.S. population is clustered in densely populated metropolitan areas,6 the majority of the population currently lacks access to land on which to grow food. In the face of environmental, economic, and social equity challenges, it is imperative that the government, at federal, state, and local levels, establish policies that promote sustainable urban agriculture to ensure access to an adequate food supply produced with minimal impact on the environment. Environmental threats stemming from climate change and the depletion and degradation of natural resources will increasingly impact the planet’s food production system.7 The current economic crisis has increased the burden on the government to provide relief in the forms of unemployment compensation8 and supplemental nutrition assistance.9 An inherent consequence of the economic crisis is a widening disparity between the rich and poor and increased social inequity between the socioeconomic classes in America. Establishing a sustainable urban agricultural system would reduce the environmental degradation that is caused by modern agricultural practices, reduce the financial strain on government resources by increasing urban productivity and enabling urbanites to grow a local food supply, and reduce socioeconomic disparities by providing less-advantaged populations in urban areas with access to an adequate supply of fresh, nutritious food.